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Security product vendors sometimes make outrageous claims – in this article we look at cloud-rendezvous style remote access systems for OT networks and how they work. We debunk the most outrageous claims, we look at residual risk that we accept when deploying these systems, and we suggest circumstances where deploying these kinds of systems actually does make sense.
Watch for an insightful webinar as we delve into the rapidly evolving landscape of OT remote access. With the surge in remote access to OT networks, industrial operations and critical infrastructures are under pressure to enhance their security measures.
IT teams newly responsible for OT security are often appalled with the results of an initial vulnerability assessment. “Patch everything! Patch it now!” is often the directive issued to engineering teams. The correct response to such a directive is “How likely is that to kill anyone?” Engineering teams cannot proceed with any change to a system until they have a clear understanding of the answer. And the answer is almost never “zero likelihood.”
The engineering profession has powerful tools to address physical risk, tools that should be applied to OT cyber risks much more routinely than they are today. For example: mechanical over-pressure relief valves prevent boilers from exploding for any reason, cyber attack or otherwise. These powerful tools are too often neglected for cyber threats because they have no analogue in IT security – they not even mentioned in most cybersecurity standards, regulations and advice.
Waterfall’s HERA is a true interactive OT remote access with unidirectional protection for OT. How does it work?
Remote access for OT is vital for maintaining efficiencies, troubleshooting, and is also important for retaining remote workers. But most remote access solutions pose a range of security risks. We introduce HERA – Hardware-Enforced Remote Access – as a safer alternative.
It turns out that there are really only three ways that ransomware can shut down OT networks and physical operations: “abundance of caution” shutdowns, OT dependencies on IT systems and services, and ransomware impacting OT networks and systems directly.
For forty years now, we have automated physical operations with computers in the name of increased operating efficiencies – deploying ever more targets for cyber attacks.
What happens when we close the loop in mining operations? How can we prevent Internet-exposed services being compromised?
Engineers have very recently started to use the “OT” term, primarily when interacting with enterprise security teams. Engineers use the term to refer to the computers and networks that control important, complex, and often dangerous physical processes
