physical security – Waterfall Security Solutions https://waterfall-security.com Unbreachable OT security, unlimited OT connectivity Thu, 28 Dec 2023 14:28:20 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9 https://waterfall-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/cropped-favicon2-2-32x32.png physical security – Waterfall Security Solutions https://waterfall-security.com 32 32 Safety, Security and IEC 62443 in Building Automation | Episode 115 https://waterfall-security.com/ot-insights-center/ot-cybersecurity-insights-center/safety-security-and-iec-62443-in-building-automation-episode-115/ Tue, 14 Nov 2023 07:56:33 +0000 https://waterfall-security.com/?p=13890 Cybersecurity and IEC 62443 are increasingly relevant to building automation. Parking garages contain safety-critical CO2 sensors that control fans, the MGM breach is in the news and standards bodies are debating minimum security levels for different kinds of systems. Kyle Peters of Intelligent Buildings joins us to look at IEC 62443-2-1 style security assessments of modern buildings and what we can learn from those assessments.

The post Safety, Security and IEC 62443 in Building Automation | Episode 115 appeared first on Waterfall Security Solutions.

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Safety, Security and IEC 62443 in Building Automation | Episode 115

Cybersecurity and IEC 62443 are increasingly relevant to building automation. Parking garages contain safety-critical CO2 sensors that control fans, the MGM breach is in the news and standards bodies are debating minimum security levels for different kinds of systems. Kyle Peters of Intelligent Buildings joins us to look at IEC 62443-2-1 style security assessments of modern buildings and what we can learn from those assessments.
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Podcast Episode 115 - Kyle Peters - Building Automation IEC 62443

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Kyle Peters of Intelligent BuildingsKyle Peters is an OT Cybersecurity consultant at Intelligent Buildings.

Kyle is a “breaker of things, a finder of solutions, a trusted friend in the industry”. Intelligent Buildings LLC was founded in 2004 and is a leader in the building automation industry, guiding investors, landlords, and renters in many different ownership and building types, including commercial, corporate, government, military, multifamily, higher education, and healthcare. Kyle discusses some of the cybersecurity aspects and considerations that go into securing an ‘Intelligent Building’, as well as some typical issues he has become familiar with over the years.

“…the building & facilities guys put the username and password on a sticky note stuck to the bottom of the monitor. Now some of them get super sophisticated about this and they put it on the bottom of the keyboard…”
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Transcript of this podcast episode #115: 
Safety, Security & IEC 62443

Please note: This transcript was auto-generated and then edited by a person. In the case of any inconsistencies, please refer to the recording as the source.

Nathaniel Nelson
welcome listeners to the industrial security podcast. My name is Nate Nelson I’m here with Andrew Ginter the vice president of industrial security at waterfall security solutions. He’s going to introduce the subject and guest of our show today Andrew how are you.

Andrew Ginter
I’m very well thank you our guest today is Kyle Peters he is a senior consultant at intelligent buildings and he’s going to be talking about safety and security and how it all fits together with IEC 62443 in building automation.

Nathaniel Nelson
Then without further ado here is you and Kyle.

Andrew Ginter
Hello Kyle and welcome to the podcast before we get started can I ask you to say a few sentences about yourself and about the good work that you’re doing at intelligent buildings.

Kyle Peters
Yeah, thanks. Andrew so ah, my name’s Kyle Peters I’m a senior consultant for intelligent buildings and I primarily focus on cyber securityity for building automation systems which right now.

Kyle Peters
Encompasses me doing onsite and virtual assessments of those systems a lot of preconstruction document reviews and policy and creation guidelines and I kind of got started in this from the other side where I was a programmer of. Building Automation systems and moved over into this world. Ah, this side of things by way of seeing problems that I was running into and so now I get to help out the guys doing what I used to do. To better secure. Their building automation systems.

Andrew Ginter
Thanks for that. Um, and our topic is everything from. Safety to IEC 62443 in you know, cyber security for building automation. Um, you know I understand that you do a lot of assessments in the space. Can you walk me through one of your assessments. What do you find in these buildings that you’re looking at.

Kyle Peters
Yeah, so primarily we’ll do ah we we like to follow the 62443 framework and the CSMS that you’ll find at the end of part 2-1 of of the standard and.

Kyle Peters
That that framework that walks us through we you know we get started on a project and we have a high level assessment and so I do a lot. We do a lot more of those of the high-level assessments and that’s where we would walk into a site and visually inspect and. Do some very light ah work on the computer systems or investigation on the computer systems. Um, and we’re looking for vulnerabilities or threats or risks that exist within the building automation system. So I walk around and I might look at I might find things like. Cellular modems that ah the vendor the the the controls company themselves put in place for them to more easily do maintenance I might find operating systems that are severely outdated I might find network equipment. That was installed in the early nineteen ninety s and is still running hopefully um and probably covered in about three inches of dust bunnies. So it’s those kinds of things that we look for and that sets us up to move on down the line of of the program. So that we can get a more in-depth look and we can start developing policies and doing those sorts of things to to really take their their program and implement countermeasures and those kinds of things to to make their program stronger.

Kyle Peters
Okay, so from there from that assessment we will. We will take that and turn it into a report obviously that we would give back to the client so that they have a roadmap um as a path to success so that they can. They can head forward and and make their systems more secure and more resilient resiliency is probably in my mind one of the more critical things to look at there so that in the event of something occurring. Be it. An attack from outside or an accident from inside ah that they can recover from that issue.

Andrew Ginter
okay and you mentioned 62443-2-1. I haven’t read that in a while. Ah, you mentioned Appendix B can you can you give us just a ah bit of background. What is 2-1 and and what’s Appendix B and and how do you use it.

Kyle Peters
Yeah, so 2-1 is ah it’s entitled the establishment of an industrial automation and control system security program. So. It’s basically just how you get started and and how how you get going with a security program within an industrial control space or in our case buildings. And Appendix B is the roadmap for that and it literally has a diagram that shows where you’re at so we use that as our as our diagram for our whole program that we get going and specifically as it relates to what we’ve been talking about with walkthroughs. That would be the the second section the high level risk assessment and so that helps us determine what risks already exist within a facility within a building automation system and at that point we’re also going to start looking at. What the target is that they’re trying to achieve so that we know where the disparities are and we can help the the client develop their program from there into ah something that more closely reflects what they’re trying to achieve.

Andrew Ginter
Um, so you know for anyone who hasn’t looked at the the 62443 series of standards in a while I mean I’m most familiar with 3-3 which is the one that says you know you have to have antivirus here. You have to have long passwords there.

Andrew Ginter
IEC 62443 is the yeah you know the whole family of industrial automation standards. 1-1 is you know concepts and terminology it talks a lot about zones and conduits which are basically you know subnets. It’s network segmentation. Um. 2-1 is the one we’re talking about here which is getting started with an an automation and control system security program 2-3 is patch management 2-4 um has to do with you know when you’re establishing a program. What are the requirements for the program. So 2-1 is getting started 2-4 is you know all the rules 3-3 is all the the rules for you know which controls to put in. 3-2 is doing risk assessments. You know 4-1 is secure product development. This is for the developers of of products you know 4-2 talks about um, you know requirements for for security programs. There’s a lot in there and. What we’re talking about today mostly is the the 2-1 which is getting started designing one of these programs in the first place as opposed to looking at at individual measures like you know password length
-2:27

Andrew Ginter
So that makes sense. Um, but you know you you said a moment ago when on your walks through you’re finding ancient gear you’re finding you know dust and presumably neglect. Um.

Andrew Ginter
It sounds a little depressing. You know when you compare what’s there to what’s in you know, 2-1 Um you find gaps I assume you know is any of this changing. What’s changing in this space.

Kyle Peters
So the the biggest thing that that has changed recently in the in the last three to 4 years obviously with covid and work from home. There’s but it was started before that but it you know. That timef frame really accentuated this that ah remote access has become a big thing and I think that that is starting to drive more awareness towards cybersecurity for these buildings that before this ah the the most common thing we might hear is. Who’d what’s the worst that can happen. You know it gets warm in an office and now they’re starting building owners and property managers are starting to see more of that risk because it’s happening in other sectors and they’re realizing that they’re online more now. Ah. To to so that that risk is heightened at that point.

Andrew Ginter
So remote access I mean you know I’m looking at the news just yesterday at you know we’re we’re recording this here just yesterday. Um, there was news that MGM had been breached. You know details are scarce. Apparently the attackers claim that they did some social engineering they made a 10 minute phone call to the to the help desk and got in now they didn’t say remote access but you know my guess would be I don’t know that someone gave them a password um a game. Don’t know how credible this is. It’s very early days. You know do you have a take on on what’s happening at mgm.

Kyle Peters
You know it it as you mentioned it’s it’s hard to say at this time but I can envision ah bringing this over to the building automation side if if I were to call up and pretend to be the. Ah. The the the vendor the the programmer for their building automation system. Maybe I I installed their tritium system or something I don’t have to have actually done it I just have to know that it’s there and pretend to be that guy and say you know I’m really trying they called. They’ve got an issue I’m trying to help him remotely Can you go over. There should be a sticky note this happens I see this all the time that that the the building the facilities guys put the username and password on a sticky note stuck to the bottom of the monitor now some of them get super sophisticated about this and they put it on the bottom of the keyboard. Ah, so that you have to turn the keyboard over to see it. But um, you know if I called up as you mentioned if I call up help desk and say hey you know I’m trying to fix this forum. Can you just go look and tell me what that what that says real quick so that I can take care of that that might be 1 thing. You know we can also ah if I on a call. Again, pretend to be a vendor and figure out what systems they have then I know what protocols they have and I might be a short showdown search away from discovering ah where where their systems are located at on the internet you know finding an ip address and.

Kyle Peters
Perhaps getting into things very quickly that way just just from a conversation.

Andrew Ginter
So Nate as you and I record it’s it’s a few weeks after we recorded the the session with Kyle um, more is known about the the MGM hack. Um, the ah you know. The reports in public suggest that what happened was there was social engineering the bad guys called up and ah, you know, persuaded the help desk that they were legit and you know they had the ah the account name but they’d done some you know some. Research on social media on Linkedin. They found some employee names they came in impersonating one of the employees said you know I’ve lost my my accounts messed up. Can you reset my two-factor authentication so they had two-factor authentication. Allegedly, it’s just these are news reports. Allegedly enabled and so they they called in and got all that reset so that they could log in um and you know stole I don’t know um the the reports I’m reading said unknown terabytes of information so it was an information theft process.

Andrew Ginter
Allegedly, ah you know they were apparently eventually discovered so they handed the credentials over to another part of the you know the the underground economy the ransomware ecosystem who started encrypting everything in sight and. Ah, encrypted a parade lot of of servers and virtual machines and eventually impaired the the gaming systems the access control systems the reservation systems and everything ground to a halt.

Nathaniel Nelson
Yeah, you know I think that last bit has to be the most surprising part of this all for me that you could as a general ransomware actor. That’s just trying to lock up Files and whatnot end up Affecting. You know I don’t know slot machines and doors and such. How could it be that those systems are so interconnected.

Andrew Ginter
A short answer is I don’t know in this particular case. Um you know MGM hasn’t published their network architecture. Um, and I don’t really don’t know about the gaming machines I just I don’t know how that part of the of the industry works. But you know, let’s talk about the the door systems. Um, you know the when we talk about ot um you know I’m not sure I asked Kyle is but you know is the door lock system part of OT. Or is OT really the air conditioning the power systems the sort of the hard OT um, but you know we waterfall puts out a ah ah threat report last year. There were 57 incidents worldwide that caused shutdowns of everything from buildings to you know um. Oil terminals. Um and very commonly I don’t I don’t have the numbers but it it’s very common that the ransomer group targets it does damage on it and then operations has to shut down. Because operations depends on something in it and you know it might be that the doorlock systems were an it or it might just be that the doorlock systems depended on I don’t know active directory to log into an active directory was crippled or it might be that the doorlock systems depended on.

Andrew Ginter
Some other system in in it that had been crippled. These dependencies seemed to be responsible for a lot of physical shutdowns. Um, when it’s really, it’s it systems that go down but but you know. People haven’t done their dependency analysis and it and it bites them.

Andrew Ginter
Well again, that sounds depressing um are people are people waking up to this.

Kyle Peters
I think so yes as we do more of these assessments that risk assessments that we’ve talked about the eyes start opening a little more and um, you know here to intelligent buildings. We have a remote solution that ah ah, uses a 0 trust architecture and whatnot. That’s one solution you guys waterfall. You have the unitdirectional gateways and I really do wish I saw a lot more of that kind of thing as well within building automation systems not just in the industrial sector. So. People are starting to take note I’m seeing less and less unsecured team viewer connections and more and there’s other products out there too. You know there’s more. There’s more solutions coming up every day so I’m starting to see more and more of that. But. As much as I say I’m seeing more there’s still a long road to go ah and as awareness grows I think we’re going to see that percentage of unsecure. Ah ah, internet access or remote access sites. That number going down. Hopefully.

Andrew Ginter
Well, you know it’s It’s good that there’s progress. Um, when we were you know talking about the possibility of this podcast I Remember you used a buzzword that I wasn’t familiar with you said that you know you do security assessments risk assessments. Said you also do Spec reviews. What’s that?

Kyle Peters
Yeah, so a spec review you know the the specifications that come out leading up to a project So before construction be that be that a new construction a building coming up out of the ground or maybe we’re redoing a floor. Ah, we get the specifications of what’s going to be going in so design design documents and um information about the systems that a vendor is planning on installing so we look at those before they’re built. So that hopefully we can ah avoid building in issues from from day one. Um, there’s and there’s all kinds of things that we see there from specs that call out the use of ancient technology. Ah, outdated operating systems those sorts of things so we try to catch those issues when it’s when it’s most cost effective to fix them and that is before they are purchased and then give those results back the engineer reviews they change the Spec hopefully and um. And then we can help ensure that a building is built designed and built to meet the clients ah own Cyber security policies and their goals. Ah for for being as cybersecure as possible.

Andrew Ginter
Um, okay, so so you know I guess it makes sense when you’re when you’re looking at a spec. You know you want to design the building to be sort of modern and secure. Um, what does that mean though I mean I’m guessing that a Bank. Needs a different kind of system than does like a parking garage.

Kyle Peters
Yeah, yeah, Absolutely the the risks are different and we’ve seen all kinds of this stuff I’ve seen it in doing assessments where ah the bank needs to protect ah against Nation-state attackers that they’re actually getting hit on a daily basis. And their parking garage um may not have much more than fans and co or N O two sensors and so they don’t view the criticality the same so they set different targets. For that so that they can put resources where they have deemed that they’re needed.

Kyle Peters
So we use the 62443 standard to help ah get this program in line where they have their their security levels of 0 through four where we say zero is essentially we don’t need to protect that system at all and. Ah, 4 is the ability to protect against nation state attackers or something extremely high level like that and most buildings fall somewhere in that 1 to 2 range where they need to be able to be resilient they need because the ah the CO2 sensor for instance. That’s that’s something that’s critical in that space but may not have quite the same impact if it goes down or is is becomes vulnerable as the ah the cooling system for the data center. That keeps the whole bank running. So that’s why they set different targets for different systems and different buildings. Perhaps.

Andrew Ginter
Now that’s interesting I mean I’m coming from sort of the the heavy industry perspective in heavy industry. Safety is always job one if you know if a hacker gets into the CO2 sensor and reprograms it to say you know it’s not. Ah, 3% co 2 in the air that is is going to trigger the fans. It’s 90% CO2 in the air. That’s a safety issue people in the garage are going to get sick or worse um should the CO2 sensor not be you know. Really thoroughly protected just like the the Bank’s Data Center

Kyle Peters
It’s a good point and yes it should be protected. We don’t want that system to be completely vulnerable I would I would never put that as ah at a 0 for instance. Ah, but as far as the the risk. Maybe. Maybe you know depends on the construction of things obviously and so we still want to protect it. But do we need to put the amount of resources towards that ah that we do other systems and that is up to the client and that is up to what their risk tolerance is. Um, as you mentioned that starts getting into a life safety issue which I think is important. Ah so we would want to protect that and maybe 1 of our protections is that we don’t have. Ah, connectivity to that system. Maybe it’s a standalone system. Um I don’t like I don’t like necessarily having ah the air gap mentality as a a firm way of protecting. So as they as someone might say philosophy of protection for a system. But ah maybe we put that as read-only points, you know they have to be hardcoded in or something so we find countermeasures that make sense for the application.

Kyle Peters
That we’re looking at.

Kyle Peters
This very issue is actually being discussed within a group called building cybersecurity.org. It’s bcs.org and we’re working on taking the 62443 standard and making it ah more applicable to buildings and. Safety instrumentation systems. Ah that are very common within industrial controls are less common or not common at all within building automation and so this is still something that is is being debated on how to handle these things as this. As this industry matures.

Andrew Ginter
Okay so Nathan let me add here. Um, you know I’m I’m watching what some of the the drafting teams are doing in 62443 not just I know I’m not part of the the building automation bcs.org. Um, the question of security levels is being debated even more widely than than bcs.org. What are security levels. Let me let me back up a moment. They’re basically four levels. Um, that describe the the capability of an adversary that you have to defeat with your security program. So you know SL1 says I’ve got a program that’s strong enough to defeat script kitties who know, almost nothing by know and download it tool press some buttons and get in trouble. Um, you know SL2 in my recollection is something like you know insiders who’ve got some knowledge who’ve got some permissions. Ah, SL3 is basically you know they don’t use the terminology but I read it as organized crime and SL4 I read as nation states and so if you say I need you know my network has to be withstand an SL4 attack. It has to withstand a really sophisticated kind of attack and safety systems. You might ask? well. How should they be protected. Um well a that’s being debated and you know one of the the observations I make in in you know the book that I just released is that um it makes sense. It often makes sense to use different security levels for different adversaries.

Andrew Ginter
And so if the ransomware groups nowadays are using what used to be Nation-state techniques and you know they’re they’re trailing nation-states by only a few years. It really makes sense to take really sensitive systems like these safety systems and protect them from Nation-state-grade network attacks. But. The other controls like the antivirus and you know those controls really? ah are passwords or you know access management. Those controls really are relevant to physical access to people who you know who are are insiders not who are coming in across the network. And the insiders tend to be much less capable. They tend not to be you know to to have nation-state attack tool capabilities and knowledge and so you know what I’m seeing people start to do is using different security levels within the same network for different types of security controls the controls that are focused on insiders. Might be set at an SL2 even for the safety systems because you know the the insiders just aren’t that clever bluntly. Um whereas the the security tools that are focused against network attacks coming in from the outside are at a much higher level. So. Yeah, it’s It’s ah it’s something that’s being debated in multiple places in the industry this whole question of of I call it the question of “how much is enough?”

Nathaniel Nelson
I’m going to use it as ah as an excuse that your book is very new and so I haven’t got a chance to read it yet. But I guess what I’m wondering is why you wouldn’t otherwise just ramp up all of your defenses as much as you’re able to is it just a matter of resources because. In my head when you say okay then sat doesn’t have a nation State’s capabilities. Well what if a nation state plants somebody in ah in a manufacturing or wherever you’re talking about I know that that’s a bit far off, but why wouldn’t you overestimate their capabilities rather than. Try to guess exactly who you might be up against.

Andrew Ginter
But you you certainly? you know in theory you can protect everything to nation state level but it gets very expensive. Um, and you know the question is is it is it really needed pause. So for example, um, if you have. I don’t know if you’re running something insane like a nuclear generator. Um, you have to have everything at the nation-state level meaning even the the security controls that you have deployed to protect against insider attacks. You’ve got to consider the fact that a nation-state might put a sleeper or 3 you know a spy into your organization twenty years ago and activate the spy today because conflicts are ramping up. You know is it really reasonable for a building you know, ah you know an office tower with ah with a parking garage to take. Measures that are sufficient to detect sleepers that other nations have put into their organization. You know, twenty years ago that’s just overkill. Um, so yeah, it’s a cost thing you you look at the the you know the obligation that. Um, all of us have who are operating you know, dangerous equipment the obligation we have is not to do the most that is possible. The obligation we have is to do something reasonable to do what any reasonable person would do if they were in our shoes.

Andrew Ginter
And saying I’m going to protect against you know intelligence agencies planting sleepers in my my building that you know you know keeps. Ah um I don’t know keeps a retail store going.

Andrew Ginter
That’s just not reasonable and and you know it’s It’s a lot of money to spend on stuff that isn’t reasonable.

Nathaniel Nelson
I take your point Andrew and I agree if you’re operating a nuclear facility versus a building automation system then you would apply.

Nathaniel Nelson
Different security controls to those 2 situations. But if I understood correctly what you were saying originally it was that you would apply different grades of security to different kinds of systems within 1 site which is what I’m more curious about like whether it’s building automation or a nuclear facility. Why you wouldn’t set all of your security controls to a level 4 a level 2 or what have you.

Andrew Ginter
Um, that’s a good question so you know I answered the question that that certain security tools protect you against insiders versus. Outsiders and outsiders nowadays tend to be much more sophisticated than insiders. So. There’s some distinction that that you make across different kinds of tools within the same network. But ah, you’re asking is the whole network you know fine you decide that it’s SL2 for insiders and SL4 for outsiders but is the whole network 2 for insiders and 4 for outsiders. Or you know is it 3 somewhere and um the answer is that in theory. You know what? what 62443 says is you know every little network that has a slightly different function. You might give a different security level to in practice that gets really complicated. And you start making mistakes about applying you know the wrong security controls to the wrong networks the wrong level of security control. So in practice. What I observe people doing yeah is applying pretty much the same set of standards the same approach to ah security controls. To entire networks just because you know breaking stuff up into 73 sub-networks each with a different security policy is just hard but in in theory you could do that.

Andrew Ginter
There you go. So so that’s progress industry wide. Um, this has been great Kyle thank you for joining us. Ah, before we let you go you know cana sum up what? what should we be taken away here.

Kyle Peters
Yeah, you know I think ah I think the biggest thing to take away is that there is hope there that things are looking up and the building automation industry is kind of slowly but steadily working on catching up to.

Kyle Peters
The it industry and the ICS industries with regards to maturity in cybersecurity as I mentioned groups like bcs.org are doing great things to help ah push things along and my advice would be that you know we’re going to do things like. Ah, remote connectivity and remote management of Systems. Don’t be the bottom wrong on the ladder you know? let’s let’s start taking a look at this and take Cyber security Seriously um and it’s not just it’s not just who would want to Attack. It’s. Ah, how do we keep our systems running no matter what happens um somebody spills coffee on the server you know I mean those kinds of things are are little things that we look at to keep systems resilient and ah you know here are intelligent buildings like so we we do ah the assessments we do. Ah, managed services to help keep things going once they’re operational so things like that I think I think we’re moving in a positive direction and I’m very excited to see where the future takes us in this industry and and. I Love It. You know it’s ah it’s just a great great industry to be in with some awesome people of keeping buildings running for the world to keep working.

Nathaniel Nelson
Andrew that was your interview with Kyle. Do you have anything to take us all out with today?

Andrew Ginter
Yeah, um, you know we’ve had a couple of episodes on building automation before I’m I’m reminded one of them I think has in the title Twenty Thousand CPUs and we talked about really how. How many you know CPUs in thermostats are scattered through ah a large building like a skyscraper and how exposed these systems are because you know people can touch the thermostats they can pull them off the wall to get access to the wiring. Um, you know they’re they’re exposed to attacks in ways that you know other systems just aren’t. Um I remember an episode talking about destroying a 300 ton chiller by operating it too fast for a number of hours. The the blades that moved the liquid coolant were moving too fast and there was vacuum cavities forming behind these blades tremendous vibration over a course of hours that you destroy the cooler. Um, and today we’re talking about. Um you know bcs.org. Ah, the organization is debating security levels. It’s basically asking the question, “How much is enough?” How much security is enough for different kinds of of networks and. You know I observed that I see that debate in the larger iec 62443 standards community as well and you know the the larger community in part I mean there’s many reasons to to revisit this question but in part it’s because um, the threat environment’s evolving ah you know tools and techniques that.

Andrew Ginter
You know, fifteen thirteen years ago when when the standard I’m most familiar with the 3-3 standard when that standard came out the tools and and techniques that nation states were using that was sl-4 today are being used by ransomware which is Sl-3 adversaries and so you know how many of the security approaches the security controls that used to be appropriate to nation states at the SL4 level now need to be reclassified at the SL3 level all of this is is being debated because again you know threats continue to evolve and. You know I sum the whole thing up as ah with the question. How much is enough. How much security is enough. How high do we put the bar this is in a sense a constant debate but in the the standards community. It’s it’s being specifically debated in the last I think twelve months or so.

Nathaniel Nelson
Well then thank you to Kyle Peters for bringing all of that to our attention and Andrew thank you for speaking with me as always. This has been the industrial security podcast from waterfall. Thanks to everybody out there listening.

Andrew Ginter
It’s always a pleasure. Thank you Nate.

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The post Safety, Security and IEC 62443 in Building Automation | Episode 115 appeared first on Waterfall Security Solutions.

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Physical Security Supports Cybersecurity | Episode 114 https://waterfall-security.com/ot-insights-center/ot-cybersecurity-insights-center/physical-security-supports-cybersecurity-episode-114/ Tue, 07 Nov 2023 10:03:31 +0000 https://waterfall-security.com/?p=13810 Adversaries who can physically touch a target have a huge advantage when it comes to compromising that target. Mike Almeyda of Force5 joins us to look at tools for physical security that support cybersecurity, especially for the North American NERC CIP standards.

The post Physical Security Supports Cybersecurity | Episode 114 appeared first on Waterfall Security Solutions.

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Physical Security Supports Cybersecurity | Episode 114

Adversaries who can physically touch a target have a huge advantage when it comes to compromising that target. Mike Almeyda of Force5 joins us to look at tools for physical security that support cybersecurity, especially for the North American NERC CIP standards.
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Waterfall team

Podcast Episode 114 with Mike Almeyda

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Mike Almeyda of Force5

Mike Almeyda is a Senior Account Manager at Force 5. Mike’s experience is in enterprise risk management and power utility compliance. He served as a Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Compliance Auditor with SERC Reliability Corporation for two years, where he led audit teams in CIP Compliance Audits and spot-checks for over 25 CIP audits. Mike has particular expertise in NERC/CIP compliance enforcement.

Mike’s extensive experience navigating regulations spans both sides of the regulatory table. At Florida Power & Light, Mike served as Manager of Power Delivery Reliability Standards & Compliance and Manager of Training and Execution Assurance. He provided direct oversight to compliance sustainability and quality assurance for the Power Delivery Business Unit, spanning all NERC Reliability Standards. He also led compliance activities, ensuring full compliance with all legislative and regulatory initiatives, as well as reviewed cyber security and infrastructure protection compliance protocols and procedures, ensuring complete alignment with national and regional regulatory requirements (NERC CIP Standards/FERC Orders). Mike later returned to SERC to serve as Manager of Business Process & Risk Assessment, where he provided strategic leadership and tactical planning for the organization, developed the regulatory risk profile for SERC’s area of responsibility, and implemented continuous process improvement methodologies across the corporation.

“…when you remove that first area of defense and you no longer have a human performing that function. You got to ask yourself the question: Well what can I do? How can I provide oversight protection, safety, and security for my site if I don’t have somebody that’s looking over them?”
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Transcript of this podcast episode #114: 
Physical Security Supports Cybersecurity with Mike Almeyda from Force 5

Please note: This transcript was auto-generated and then edited by a person. In the case of any inconsistencies, please refer to the recording as the source.

Nathaniel Nelson
Hey everybody and welcome to the industrial security podcast. My name is Nate Nelson I’m here with Andrew Ginter the vice president of industrial security at Waterfall Security Solutions. He’s going to introduce the subject and guest of our show today Andrew has it gone.

Andrew Ginter
I’m very well thank you our guest today is Mike Almeyda. Mike is a senior account manager at Force 5 and Force 5 does physical security for electric utilities and physical security is tied into cyber security you you don’t have cyber if you don’t have physical. So he’s going to talk about physical security and and the connection to cyber.

Nathaniel Nelson
All right? Then let’s jump right into it

Andrew Ginter
Hello Michael and welcome for hello Michael and and welcome to the podcast. Um I should say. Thank you here. We go hello Michael and thank you for joining us. Um. Before we get started can I ask you to say a few words about yourself for our listeners and you know talk about the good work that you’re doing at force 5.

Mike Almeyda
All right? Andrew thank you so much for bringing me on your podcast honor to be here. My name is Mike Almeyda I am a senior account manager at force 5 I’ve been with the company for about 5 years altogether in the power utility space I’m entering my thirteenth year in here I had a previous career in the United States army as an officer for a number of years and my career stems from being a sip auditor working for a power utility and now working for a vendor at force five we focus on reducing risk at every. Entry point of a power utilities facility. So thanks again for having me Andrew.

Andrew Ginter
That’s great. Um, and our topic today is physical security interacting with or supporting industrial cybersecurity. You know we’re we’re the industrial security podcast most of what we talk about is cyber security. How does physical security fit with. Cybersecurity.

Mike Almeyda
Sir it’s a great great question Andrew and I’ll I’ll tell you ah at the at the crux of the matter physical security really ensures that you’re keeping the bad actors out of your facilities. You’re doing your best job to validate. That those individuals have a business need that they’ve met your site specific training they meet out your policies before they come on site and it’s important to limit who comes on your site because therein lies the problem right? The first part of any. Type of criminal or bad actor is always looking to circumvent your physical security process and with the right toolset and the right skillset once they get inside your facility without being challenged that gives them the opportunity to get to areas of your facility that house. Critical infrastructure protection components especially when we talk about cyber securityity this could be network cables switches routers. You name it the moment that they get the physical access into your site. Cyber security is just a keystroke away right.

Andrew Ginter
So so in principle that makes sense I mean I I agree with you. Can you give us an example I mean you know how much trouble can we get into.

Mike Almeyda
Yeah, so this actually is ah it brings up a funny story. Not really funny, but a really important story understanding why cybersecurity is so important. So as I mentioned in my introduction I did spend ah a number of years in the military and and I was deployed. This is back in 2008 I got a phone call from my brigade communications officer about two o’clock in the morning and she told me which is this is now a declassified operation but we had to disable. Every single Usb drive across all of the computers in my area of operation and at the time I probably had over 2000 pcs and I was geographically dispersed in 9 locations in Iraq and had 24 hours to do it. My soldiers and I completed the mission. But the reason we had to do that. Is because there was a signature of of a malware that was attempting to send information from our our secret internet protocol to Russia and what we discovered in our after action review was that it appeared that the the. Virus or the the trojan horse originated from a Usb stick that someone had plugged into our network whether it was inadvertently or inadvertently more than likely it was probably a soldier who went to the morale recreational welfare center to go and and talk home contracted the virus on that.

Mike Almeyda
Device and brought it back and put it in it to our secret computers. But the reason I bring this story up and and the importance of it is if you allow just about anybody to come onto your site without properly vetting them and making sure they meet those credentials. They can easily take a jump device. Plug it into one of your network switches or plug it into a computer that controls some of your industrial control systems and Wreak Havoc just like we experience which by the way set us back about a decade in terms of Technology. So I would absolutely consider that something you should look at when. Deciding whether or not you want to let the right people in on your site.

Nathan
you know Andrew when it comes to somebody physically at a plant. It’s not even something that I really associate with cyber I just assume that a cyber attack occurs when some. Remote entity tries to get in through technological systems. Not when somebody’s literally at a plant is this something that happens outside of the context of like Stuxnet and if so are there any defenses against it.

Andrew Ginter
Um, yes you know yes and yes let me give you sort of ah a more mundane example to start with um you know I was working at at industrial offender a long time ago. We were you know. Building software and we had to test it and so we had ah a large test bed and to standardize our testing we would reset the entire test bed to um, sort of a known state between runs. And that meant taking ah you know Linux Cds and we we’d take an image backup. So the hard drive. Basically you know every sector on the hard drive from 0 to as as big as as big as a hard drive was and you know between runs we would just put the image back on the hard drive and start from exactly the same state so we had to do this. And you know I gave the the linux boot cd and all of the the backup cds to one of my colleagues who’d never done this before explained how to do it why away 2 hours later he comes back and he says Andrew do you know that with this linux boot cd I can boot. Any device in the office here and read all of the data off the hard drive you know and I said yes I said welcome to the dark side if you can touch it. It’s yours now this was back in the day.

Andrew Ginter
Before hard drives or flash drives were routinely encrypted so to your answer is it is it real. Is it mundane. Yes, back in the day you boot into linux and you can read it. You know every every bit on the hard drive nowadays. This is why the modern world. Modern equipment is is encrypted. The hard drives are encrypted if you try to do this. You’ll get garbage back? Um, but you know the bad news is that not all of the equipment in industrial control systems is modern, a lot of it’s still older and you know even. Modern equipment is vulnerable if you can touch it. You have a huge advantage so sort of a second example is um chinese intelligence agencies have been accused of doing this to visitors in China people who visit China are encouraged to use throwaway devices and not log into. Any of their important cloud-based systems while they’re visiting why because chinese intelligence agencies have been accused of tapping the hotel on the shoulder you know having you know, tapping tapping the your business partners that that you’re there to visit on the shoulder saying. You know, take this man out for a 3 hour binge somewhere. Um and then tap the hotel on the shoulder get into the hotel room. Ah you know, look at the the laptop figure it out and leave you know, do it again the next day and come back and this time they know exactly what model laptop you have.

Andrew Ginter
They’ve got the tools they take it apart. They insert a device you know a very tiny device between the keyboard controller and the motherboard and now this tiny device is recording all of your keystrokes. They come back at the end of your visit and do the same thing removing the device putting your device all back together again and now they’ve got on that little chip. All of the keystrokes that you’ve entered all of your passwords that you’ve used in the last three days um they log into your systems and you know you’re sunk. So. And in the modern world. This is why many of the cloud systems if you want to log into them have two-factor authentication so to your question. Yes, if you can touch something you have a huge advantage in terms of compromising it and yes this is why. We see two-factor authentication. This is why we see encrypted hard drives. This is why we see a lot of modern technology being applied because this is a real problem

Andrew Ginter
Okay, so so can we talk about you know that’s that’s the problem. Can we talk about the solution I mean um, it it sounds simple. Do we not have is this not why we have guards gates and guns.

Mike Almeyda
You know we we absolutely do Andrew we have guards gates and guns. But I can tell you that with the recent financial economical strains especially on big businesses. It’s becoming more challenging to borrow money and so what I’ve seen recently. Especially one of my large customers is that they’ve made a decision to move away from a contingent guard force because the cost is astronomical at the end of the day they’re beholden to their shareholders and so when you remove that first area of defense and you no longer have a human performing that function. You got to ask yourself the question. Well what can I do? How can I how can I provide oversight protection safety and security for my site if I don’t have somebody that’s looking over them and you know you know this Andrew B in the power utility space power plants are the it’s the bread and butter of how. Power utilities not only make money but allow us to flip a switch and let the lights go on. So if we can’t afford to allow a physical person to do that. We have to do something different. And that’s one of the reasons why at force 5 we we provide solutions for outage management and really help provide internal controls that can vet individuals making sure that they have a proper business need. They’re not on some watch list.

Mike Almeyda
Have your site specific training. So you have confidence knowing that individuals who come on your site. Not only are who they say they are but have the appropriate business need and also meet all the training and policies you’ve set in place to protect your organization in the first place.

Andrew Ginter
And okay and that that makes sense and and I’m going to ask you about more you know more about what you folks do in in a moment but but work with me. You know if if you’ve got organizations that have done away with their guards I mean I mean what happens if. You know worst case, you know someone ignores your your security fence brings a ah saw cuts through the fence cuts through the doors on the way into the plant into the server room I don’t know with a Usb in his hand. Um, do you not need guards at least for incident response I mean what. What do you do? If you don’t have guards and you’ve got a situation like this.

Mike Almeyda
Right? And and this this ties back into your incident response plan as you just mentioned right? So the first thing you have to do is if you know you’re going to move away from a contingent workforce or contingent guards. You have to make sure that your policies and procedures adapt to that right? If you’re not if your policies and procedures say notify a guard and obviously you’re not using guards you need to make sure that there’s something in place to follow and really it boils down to your level of risk tolerance right? Do you really want your employees confronting somebody they think is a bad actor. Or would you probably want them to do something like call 9 1 1 call a security company. Whatever it is and more than likely your sock has probably done both already because they have videos most power utility companies I know have video footage pointing at those critical facilities and so if they see somebody that. That’s not recognizable. They’re they’re probably going to go ahead and start putting in their protective or the the protective controls to make sure that they they do that. But the truth is the the more realistic so situation is somebody finding a way to get into your site. During a major outage so they can blend in with the environment and do things being undetected.

Andrew Ginter
So so that makes sense in principle. You know if if there’s ah, an intruder in the site. There’s no guards you call 9 1 1 you call the authorities your sock might have done that for you but there’s operational. Decisions that have to be made if someone has you know cut into the survey room if someone is wandering around the facility with ah with a hammer in their hand. Um, and you know with clearly malicious intent. They’ve cut their way into the facility. The the authorities aren’t there yet. Do you keep generating power. Do you keep. Producing oil out of the refinery what you know isn’t there a decision point that has to be has to be made about about you know what do we do with someone on on site like that do we have to shut down out of out of safety.

Mike Almeyda
It’s a really really awesome question Andrew and and I guarantee you you’re going to hear different answers from different people but I can tell you you know Mike Tyson had this famous quote and it says you know everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth. So when you think about that. At the end of the day your your policies procedures your your your business continuity plan should absolutely have those steps in there and if they don’t really it comes down to the station manager. It’s it’s his decision on what to do in that scenario I guarantee you. Your executives are probably concerned about profitability and are also concerned about making sure that the plant generates money to keep the lights on but in that moment the plant manager might be about safety and security for his employees and so at the at the end of the day I think the responsibility falls on the plant manager whether he. Continues to have operations going or he chooses to shut down and there’s a lot of factors considering in that right? If if they’re in a you know let’s just say this happens in the summertime and it’s at the peak of day and it’s hot and and and you’re at your peak load. You probably don’t want to shut down your site. But if it’s something that happens in the middle of the night where it’s not really a peak load there. There probably will be more considerations to actually have the plant shut down while you deal with the security issue that makes sense.

Andrew Ginter
Well, that makes sense. You mentioned you mentioned Nerrk sip a couple of times. Um I know there are rules in nerc sip about physical security. Can you can you talk about those rules I mean um, oh pause hand. Um, ah okay so something else, you’ve said a couple of times you talked about outages now you know the questions I’ve been asking you I’ve kind of been assuming we’re talking about physical security during operations when there’s you know. The usual complement of people on site when you’ve got power coming out of the the power plant when you got you know gasoline going through the pipeline. You’ve talked about outages a couple of times. Why? Why are you talking about outages. What’s what’s special about them.

Mike Almeyda
So outages are something that that commonly occur for large generation facilities. So if you think about a car every every so often you’ve got to bring your car in for maintenance. So that way it keeps running well power plants run on the same schedule. There are certain components. Those plants that have to shut down for maintenance and so during these times you can have a large contingent workforce coming on site. In fact, there’s ah, there’s a plant that I visited not too long ago produces about three thousand four hundred Megawatts of of generation and at their peak outage. They can have about. 1500 people on site that are contractors that you don’t know them. They don’t know you but they were there to perform a service for a certain period of time and so when you think about having a large group of people you don’t know anything about them all over your power plant. Around your most criscritical assets that creates a security challenge. It also creates a safety challenge because they’ve they’ve probably never been on your site before sometimes they but have to bring vehicles on your site. So now every person in every vehicle that’s on your site creates a liability unless. You find a way to validate them and ensure that they have a proper business needs. So it’s important. This is an important part of the power utility space because if those plants don’t get everything done that they have to get done and outage and they have to extend their outage for any reason it puts strain on the on the bulkal electric systems on the on the interconnects as a whole.

Mike Almeyda
Because now someone’s got to pick up the slack for the power. That’s not being generated so again. Yes, It’s a for profit industry that generates power for dollars but at the same time if you can’t fulfill your obligations how the whole entire landscape is expecting you to then it puts. Unnecessary strain on the system as a whole and that can create issues like rolling Blackouts and whatnot which we all remember from 2003 but that wasn’t due to ah that wasn’t due to a plan outage but the point is we have to make sure that during those outages we’re getting everything done that we have to to keep the system online. And we’re also making sure that safety and security is a focal point of ensuring that none of those contingent workers are going to be in a position where they can do something to sabotage or inhibit your ability to provide services to your customers.

Andrew Ginter
Yeah I mean in theory that makes sense. Um, you know a it’s a lot of people B you know, let’s talk. Let’s talk Nerrksip if we can you know we’re we’re in a you’re you’re giving the power plant example. Um.

Mike Almeyda
Sure.

Andrew Ginter
Let’s say part of the the outage is to expand ah the capacity of the server room so we can put more servers in there to do more stuff you know more predictive maintenance more whatever and so one of the people who’s got to go into the server room is an electrician they’re setting up the new rack. Or 3 with you know, uninterupable power supplies. They’re connecting it to the power they’ve had to add some new breakers they’re in there working for a couple of days doing electrical stuff. Um, but this is the room that contains all of our control system computers. Um. How does that work. You know the plant is down. It’s not producing power. You know, do you just let the electrician in there. What’s the rule.

Mike Almeyda
Yeah that’s ah, it’s a it’s a really important rule and this is this is right in sip 6 when you have somebody you have a critical or you have a physical security perimeter that’s defined in nerc si there’s 2 ways you can do it. Right? If this is a contingent worker that you know that you’ve done ah a personnel risk assessment on you’ve performed a 7 year background check they have a valid business deed to be in that space unescorted you most certainly can give them privileges to go into that space space unescorted. In my history of being not only an auditor but working for power utility this is going to be the exception not the rule and the reason is because this is somebody that’s doing work or service for a small period of time and they’re not going to be back and so you typically want to reserve those types of. Authorized and escorted physical access for people that you trust that are going to be there from a longevity perspective more frequently. What we see is when you have a visitor coming into a physical security perimeter or psp for short, you have to. Escort them at all times within line of sight so you’ve got to make sure you document what their name is who they’re there to see document. What the reason is for them being in there. What time they arrived what time that they left this is typically done manually from but.

Mike Almeyda
Probably say about 80% of utilities. Do it manually. But again that that creates a challenge right? because if you don’t if you have sloppy handwriting or you’re not putting in the correct information and there should be an event then you’re relying on what’s written on that paper to see who is in that space who is the escort to try to decipher what happened. I Can tell you that there’s been a lot of times on the on the physical security side where an incidents happen and when they go back and try to figure out who is in the space. They couldn’t decipher the handwriting. So now they have to go and rely on cameras and and rely on different angles and talk and call up the person who they believes in the video. And as you’re doing that. It’s taking time and the more time you take the more likely whoever it is that was doing the malicious act probably is going to get away with it and and be undetected.

Andrew Ginter
Ah, and you know the standard that’s called sip Zero zero six si double o six talks about physical access control it. It says stuff like you know if you have an important. Ah.

Andrew Ginter
A piece of the electric system that is covered by nercipp that’s medium impact or high impact because there’s sort of 3 categorizations low medium and high in the nercipp if it’s medium or high. You have to have a process that restricts physical access to these systems. It’s usually described you know colloquially as a 6 walls rule. You have to have a floor you have to have a ceiling you have to be sealed floor and ceiling and on 4 walls you have to have a you know a system in place keys or technology or something that prevents random people from walking in. Um, you have to have a way to. They use different words but you have to avoid to clear people who are allowed into it. You know if you let people in whenever they want they have to be trusted people so they need to have background checks. They need training they you know they need to know what they’re doing if you have uncleared people like the electrician who needs access to the space. They have to be supervised constantly by a cleared person. You have to have technology in place to monitor if somebody enters the room who’s not authorized. You have to have alarms in place to detect unauthorized access all of this you know is part of sit. Zero zero six because um to a greater or lesser extent if you can touch a system you can compromise it or you you certainly have ah a tremendous advantage in terms of compromising it pause.

Andrew Ginter
We’re and we’re so so let’s get into the the details about about the good work. You folks are doing at force 5 you have solutions in this space. What do you have? who’s using it. You know how does this work.

Mike Almeyda
So we got started. Ironically, we got started in the si space I actually worked for a utility company and I discovered force five at the at the recommendation of a peer and at the time we’re talking about sip six here. We were in. When there was 8 regulatory regions at the time we were in all of them and so we had manual paper logs at these physical security perimeters and as you can imagine we were. We were getting audited by all 8 regional entities and we would probably get audited every year and it’s something that we consistently had a problem with and so. when when I when I approached force 5 I said hey listen I’m going to make your business requirements. Very simple for you I want an appliance that includes software and hardware I want it all 1 I want something that can easily be used. Regardless of the austerity of any type of environment whether it’s a power plant. It’s a substation. It’s a control room. It’s a corporate lobby I want the look and feel to be the same and I want a dedicated support line I don’t want to have to figure out what the hardware needs to be you figure it out for me. You all all I have to do is pick up a phone or send an email and get help and that’s how gatekeeper was birth and so we we now have an automated solution which is the only escort-d drivenven self-service logging kiosk in the industry today that enforces.

Mike Almeyda
Those policies of nerc sip at your psps and so instead of relying on paper handwritten errors trying to decipher that we have the ability to enforce your policies and procedures. So whoever the authorized escort is he or she is the only person that can use the system and start a visit. Your visitor can’t we put all the onus on the person with the responsibility and that’s how we got our start in nerc sip and then I’d say about a year and a half later we were approached by a plant manager that said hey that’s great. But I don’t care about those requirements I have hundreds of people coming to my site during an outage. They don’t need to be escorted I just need to make sure that they have met all the training. They’re not on some sort of watch list that they have a business need to be there if you can figure that out then I see a path for your solution and so force 5 worked with. With some of the outage coordinators and some of the plant superintendents and and plant managers and that’s how the the evolution of the outage management solution of gatekeeper was birth and so in this scenario we we use full height turns styles we can provide a building or or no building and we. Augment those turns styles with our kiosk to perform access controls and so if you think about what’s important to a plant manager. They want to make sure that this person has the site specific training to enter the site. They want to make sure that they’re not on some sort of watch list or have been terminated or kicked off a plan in the past.

Mike Almeyda
And they want to make sure that they have a valid business need during an outage. So when you you take all those pieces and you assign them to an identity. Our Kios in a quick moment when you use biometrics they can either use their fingerprint or they can use their face. Once they come to the kiosk and identify themselves. The system does all those checks quickly and if you meet all the criteria to enter the site and we fire the turnstiles and if you don’t we deny entry and if you match a watch list. Not only do we not deny entry but we send out emails text messages and robocalls. To interested parties letting them know that somebody that’s a bad actor is at the front gate of your facility.

Andrew Ginter
And you know you mentioned biometrics I mean it’s It’s great. Biometrics are high tech you know are they necessary I mean most places I go they use badges.

Mike Almeyda
Right necessary and and and necessary are are are definitely good questions. So I could tell you that for your trusted environment. Badges are okay and they’re okay because you you you know who the people are and. You know that they they have already been validated by your company when you talk about your untrusted environment which is the the reality here with a conting your workforce in my experience in my career I’ve seen a plethora of things happen. In fact, one time when I was working for utility I happen to be at a plant. And there was a large group of contingent workers with a plant with a leader like there was ah a contingent workforce leader that was overseeing all those people and towards the I’d say after lunchtime this gentleman grabbed all the badges from his staff and let them out. There there was another outage happening not too far away that they had a contract for and the priority for that company was that those staff be there and at the end of the day when he went to go swipe out his badge. Guess what he did he not only swiped out his badge but he swiped out the badge of his entire team and so. For our company. We went up paying for 10 to 12 individuals that left early right? So with badges the the problem with that is all they’re intended to do access control looks at the card serial number make sure that it matches an authorized.

Mike Almeyda
Entry on that list and lets him in when you use biometrics. It’s very hard to fake a face or a finger right? So you have to have something physically that’s unique to you and so what we found is not only is it expedite the process of logging people in. But it also gives you stronger validation knowing that the individual who presented that credential whether it be facial recognition or or biometric fingerprint when you have them presenting that credential. It’s a higher confidence of validation. So you know that they can’t hand their thumb. And they can’t hand their face to somebody else because you can only use it to go in and you could only use it to go out and we this the system is smart enough to know if you’ve went in 1 time we were not going to let that same identity in because it’s already in the system.

Andrew Ginter
Pause. So you know it sounds like that that scenario that that you gave there with the with the badges you know the benefit that the system was was providing the plant is ah. You know is not really a security benefit in the sense that it’s you know, keeping out people who shouldn’t be there. It was kind of an operational benefit and you know in a sense this is this is commonplace a lot of a lot of folks that we have on talking about different approaches to to solving problems in the industrial security space. A lot of the time those approaches have sort of. Ancillary operational benefits. So you know you’ve given us 1 do you have other examples of of ah you know how you can use what appears to be a security tool to you know, just make the plant more efficient.

Mike Almeyda
it’s it’s funny you say that Andrew because one of our our customers recently this year gave us a interesting story I’m going to share with you where they we always tell our clients make sure that you tell your contingent work for. Workforce when you use a solution is for a safety and security perspective because they’ll be more apt to adapt it in everyday routine. But 1 thing that that he shared with me was he’s always used this same scaffolding company for a long period of time and over the years he said he thought he was getting build or overcharge for certain certain type of of activities. They were performing and he could never validate it because for tn m or time and materials contractors. It’s it’s paper based count cards for for time cards time sheets right. So he’d say 50% of the time he’d he’d argue back and he’d win in 50% of the time he’d pay the invoice and so as soon as he leveraged our solution. He got his first invoice from the company and when he looked at it he said ah you know this doesn’t seem right and so he decided on his own Accord. You know what? um. Ah, go into gatekeeper and look at the resources that I got for the week and what he discovered when he put his invoice alongside the the record of who had actually been on the site. The invoice was for nearly double the amount of of individuals he had on the invoice. So let’s just say it was 40.

Mike Almeyda
He only got twenty and they were supposed to work 40 hour shift ah for the week and they only worked 20 hours and so when he went back to this guy. He said hey I got your invoice but I’m not paying it because you overcharge me and the guy’s like come on man you know we always go through this conversation every time we have an outage you know I won’t do that to you. And he said I get it I said but I just pulled my report from the solution that we have for safety and security or gate and I can tell you down to the second who was on my site and I can tell you that I got half the resources on this invoice at half the time. So I’m not paying this invoice and and the gentleman’s like well let me let me look into that and and and. Find out what what the problem is and the next day he calls him back. He goes oh I sent you the wrong invoice I apologize here’s the right one and and and he kind of might my my client kind of chuckled but he said ever since that that scenario happened. He never has gotten overcharged for an invoice because they now look at this as a time sheet. So again, it’s a safety and security solution. But the the contingent workers looking at as a time sheet and in addition to that one of the things he’s been able to discover in using the data that was typically stale written on paper. Now that it’s in a database. He actually can predict whether or not he’s going to have enough resources as I mentioned earlier you know if you you don’t have the resources to meet an outage and you have to extend it that puts some strain on the power system. Well using this solution. He can say well I was supposed to have.

Mike Almeyda
40 resources at 40 hours a week but for the past three weeks I’ve only had 20 resources at 20 hours so there’s ah, there’s ah he can predict predict that he’s going to fall short in that area and maybe do some other other methods to help. Condense that time a little bit shorter or bring in additional resources to compensate for the lost time that that he had because he didn’t get the resources. He was promised so that’s that’s a operational thing and and 1 other story that I want to embellish here for a moment that I think is important is is the security aspect. And I think this is operational because operational risk is something that everybody should consider especially when you have industrial control systems. We had a customer who had a a contractor that that got into an incident with the plant manager and as a result of that incident. He was placed on a wash list and walked off the site and told that he was not allowed to come on that site ever again a few weeks later that contractor decided to go work at a different site for the same company the same utility company just under a different outage and. It just so happened when he arrived the the watch list identified him as being a person that shouldn’t be on the site and that plant manager happened to be there that day because he he worked the zone and so he looked at that that individual says.

Mike Almeyda
Don’t ever come back to one of my plants ever again. You’re not allowed here and as a result of that the company the vendor company he worked for terminated his services because he could not perform it so Lo and behold several weeks go by this individual gets a job at a new vendor company. That happens to have a contract for an outage at the same power utility company and when he showed up for the outage and placed his finger on the reader it detected him regardless of what uniform he wore we were still able to identify that this is the same individual that’s on the watch list. He should not be on site. So. The the customer was extremely happy because there were 3 use cases in a span of 6 weeks where an individual who was someone that should not be on site was caught and was identified prior to allowing that individual to get on site. So. That’s a great example of the robustness of a solution. So safety security financial reconciliation any of those things are important to your plants.

Nathaniel Nelson
Most the ah the point that Mike just made definitely speaks to what’s been sticky in my mind throughout this interview which is that ah the technology that he’s describing seems most useful to me or rather most commonly useful. Not necessarily in that crazy state-sonsored like stuxnet scenario where you’re dealing with spies but where you’re dealing with more run-of-the mill insider threats which I imagine are going to be much more common for customers of his. Um, although it occurs to me as well. I don’t know if I’m misunderstanding the exact nuances. Of the technology here that it might make more sense to have like a list of people who are allowed on a site and then just exclude everybody else by default rather than having like an expressly bad list and then going from there unless there’s a good and a bad list.

Andrew Ginter
Um, in my best understanding and I didn’t quite ask the question this way but in my understanding there are both an allowed and disallowed list. It’s not like you allow everybody except people on the on the the disallowed list. Um, you don’t let any stranger into the site. My understanding is that.

Nathaniel Nelson
Understand.

Andrew Ginter
Before you let someone in they have to be entered into the system you might presumably enter them into the system when they arrive but you know, um, presumably you know assuming they have someone to vouch for them. They’re their host at the site. Um, but even if you have an allowed list. Um, you know the the biometrics I think come into play when you have a disallowed list. You’ve got biometric information for the the people that that are disallowed. You know in the example of of the the worker who changed vendors. They might well have you know I imagine they could have registered with their new employer with a subtly different name using a nickname instead of you know the long spelling of their full name and they show up as a different name a subtly different name working for a completely different employer making their first visit to the site. So. They are on the allowed list. But then the the disallowed list catches them because of the biometrics identify them as the same person with a different name who’s been banned from the site.

<DROP> So yeah far as I know it. It does both of them and it’s ah it’s a little bit complicated.

Andrew Ginter
Cool Some some very convincing use cases. Um, you know, let me ask you? We’ve been talking about about what you folks do um, can you talk about the future. What’s what’s coming in this space.

Mike Almeyda
Well I think and this is kind of ironic because we’ve talked a lot about visitor management and and how we we you know ensure the right folks come on site but more recently there’s been. A lot of shootings at substations. In fact, last year I think it was over 113 shootings at substation. So. It’s definitely got the attention of a lot of executives in the space and as a result of that we’ve we’ve partnered with the company and we’re now we’re now producing what’s called boss. It’s a ballistic overlay shield system and and the the intent of this is to provide enhanced ballistic protection security and resilience for substations and critical assets by reducing those potential attack vectors and threats right? So you think about those. That room that we talked about that hypothetical room with all this network and security equipment being shot at now is ah is a physical threat. But again you damage that equipment. It creates a problem and so we’ve we’ve developed a solution based out of. Poly you’re I think it’s polyethylene is the proper pronunciation but it’s been tested by the us military for over 2 decades but the solution we have now can stop a 7 6 2 round which is typically fired from a 3 ah 8 winchester rifle hunting rifle.

Mike Almeyda
Or an a K 47 So as you look at some of these threat vectors and threat actors that type of caliber lower is probably what they’re going to use to target your your substation whether it’s just a ah disgruntled worker trying to get back or really somebody that’s trying to do Damage. This is a ah ah big threat that we’re seeing that is certainly got. The the attention of many power utility executives and we feel like in our ability to call ourselves a risk company. This certainly fits the bill when we talk about how do we reduce risk from those type of attacks at some of the most critical systems like transformers or whatnot. In the power Utility space.

Andrew Ginter
There you go I mean distressing that this is the world we live in but it is I mean this is I guess this is why we have jobs you know, physical security cybersecurity. They interact. Um you know? Thank you for joining us and providing these insights. Before we let you go can you can you sum up for us. Pause.

Mike Almeyda
So at the beginning Andrew we werere talking about tying physical security and how it relates to cybersecurity right? So if we take cybersec securityity at the crux of it. That’s the place where you can predominantly do the most damage undetected. In your facility and so if you know that that’s one of the higher risk to your facility to your infrastructure you want to make sure that that is protected from a physical standpoint and and taking cyber securityity back to physical if I had a a handful of takeaways here’s what I’d tell you. Understand the risk that you have to your environment and what your tolerance is for it if manual processes like paper you’re willing to accept that risk then this this is probably not for you. But if someone circumventing your security getting to. And ah getting someone like an electrician to a switch room where you’ve got problems where you’ve got critical infrastructure that can get if it gets damage can cause a big problem. You probably want to automate it and when you look at automating it. You want to make sure that you can validate in force and discover things about your organization. Right? So you log the visitor you validate their identity that they have an appropriate business need to do that. You enforce your policies and procedures and you discover trends about the information that you’re getting if this sounds like something that that piques your interest or it’s a need at your power utility.

Mike Almeyda
Visit force five dot com we only work with power utility companies or feel free to reach out to me. You can find me on Linkedin just look up Mike Almeyda the same name you see in the podcast title Andrew. Thanks again for having me on today. It’s been a pleasure.

Nathaniel Nelson
Pause Andrew usually I ask you for a last word here, but this episode has given me a lot to think about. Um I think that the overall takeaway for me is that physical security is. Dovetailed always with cyber security that they are necessarily interlinked and when you don’t have the former. You can’t have the latter and also you know we’ve done over a hundred episode to the show. Ah I think that we sometimes take the physical security side for granted. By talking about you know everything else that happens on the computers as if that is just going to be taken care of but at the end of the day you know you need people like Michael to do that basic assumed implicit work. Um, so that then we can talk about the more sophisticated defenses that we spend all our time on.

Andrew Ginter
Absolutely I mean one of the the principles that you know I talk about at conferences sometimes um, you know we talk about the cyber perimeter a lot of people say oh, but the cyber perimeter is it. You know is there really is it dead because you know there’s experts on the it side say the cyber perimeter is dead. And I come back with yes, but and it might be dead on it. Networks. But you know that’s not the point. The point is that all important industrial facilities have a physical security perimeter all of them. They all have you know. If not guards gates and guns at at at least you know offence and you know a system like force 5 at the turnstile letting people into and out of the site controlling access to the site. There’s always a physical pereter. You don’t let the public walk into a dangerous facility. And you certainly don’t want you know random malicious actors walking into a dangerous facility. So yes, absolutely There’s always a physical perimeter. It’s essential to cybersecurity. You don’t have cybersecurity unless you have physical security so you know good call.

Nathaniel Nelson
Well thanks to Michael Almeyda for speaking about this with you Andrew and Andrew is always thank you for speaking with me this has been the industrial security podcast from waterfall. Thanks to everybody out there listening.

Andrew Ginter
It’s always a pleasure. Thank you Nate.

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The post Physical Security Supports Cybersecurity | Episode 114 appeared first on Waterfall Security Solutions.

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