

#### SECURE OPERATIONS TECHNOLOGY

WHAT DO THE WORLD'S MOST SECURE SITES

DO DIFFERENTLY?


2020



#### CONVENTIONAL SECURITY

- Intrusion detection, security monitoring & incident response
- Passwords & permissions
- Anti-virus, security updates & host hardening
- Firewalls, encryption, VPNs, jump hosts, MFA
- Offline backups! (tested)

There are a lot of ways that attackers & malware can enter a control system





#### RESIDUAL RISK

#### RISK MANAGEMENT OPTIONS

MITIGATE - TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE FREQUENCY OR REDUCE CONSEQUENCES

-requency

TRANSFER - PAY AN INSURER TO ACCEPT THE RISK

ACCEPT – DO NOTHING / SUFFER CONSEQUENCES

Any risks we cannot transfer or mitigate, we accept

#### Consequence

				THE LAND		
		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Significant	Severe
7	Very Likely	Med Low	Medium	Med Hi	High	High
	Likely	Low	Med Low	Medium	Med High	High
2.4	Possible	Low	Med Low	Medium	Med Hi	Med Hi
	Unlikely	Low	Med Low	Med Low	Medium	Med Hi
	Very Unlikely	Low	Low	Med Low	Medium	Med Hi



# SECURE **OPERATIONS** TECHNOLOGY



protect the information



#### SEC-OT:

protect physical operations **from** the information




#### FIRST THREE LAWS OF SCADA SECURITY

- Nothing is secure
- 2. All software can be hacked
- 3. All attacks are information, and every bit of information can be an attack

In the worst case, a compromised CPU will issue every unsafe instruction the CPU is electrically able to issue





# ONLINE & OFFLINE PERIMETERS



Critical network = a set of ICS networks



There are always perimeters for important sites & networks

Secure sites physically control information flows



# OFFLINE CONTROLS

Offline Survey

Test Beds

Removable Media

Removable Devices

**New Cyber Assets** 

**Insider Attacks** 

**Deceived Insiders** 

Nonessential Equipment



# WHAT'S NEW

Near-miss protocol for information incidents



Forbid firewalls as connection from ICS to IT networks – permit only unidirectional gateways

# ONLINE CONTROLS

SEC-OT practice:
one layer of
unidirectional gateways
in a defense-in-depth
architecture

Use firewalls for internal ICS segmentation

WHAT'S NEW: two dozen unidirectional network reference architectures

#### UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAY



**INDUSTRIAL NETWORK** 

CORPORATE NETWORK

#### Unidirectional Security Gateways are a combination of hardware and software


- The hardware sends information in only one direction
- The software replicates servers & emulates devices from the OT network to the IT network
- No attack, no matter how sophisticated, can propagate back to the industrial network through the gateway



### HOW IS THIS PRACTICAL

**Industrial Network** 

**Enterprise Network** 






Industrial Control Systems (ICS) at a site almost always need to cooperate and coordinate

#### CONTROL-CRITICAL NETWORK SETS

**Industrial Network** 

**Enterprise Network** 



Control-critical networks are sets of ICS networks.


Firewalls are used routinely within the set,
but not across network criticality boundaries



#### DISCIPLINED CONTROL

- Something always needs to get back in to control-critical networks
- Industrial Internet Consortium (IIC): Every information flow from "higher level" networks into control-critical networks is a kind of control
- Firewall only one flow control hammer "open another port"


Disciplined control – the safest mechanism to meet a business need efficiently



Industrial Internet Consortium Reference Architecture



#### EXAMPLE: QUERY / RESPONSE



Industrial Network


DMZ

**Enterprise Network** 

All incoming communications are a kind of control Eliminate what can be eliminated Impose strict discipline on the remainder




#### OPC SERVER REPLICATION



With the entire OPC Server replicated, there is no need for OPC requests to pass from the DMZ into the control network



#### OPC SERVER REPLICATION



Industrial Natwork

Control-Critical
Network

DMZ

**Enterprise Network** 

The OT network in this example is the control-critical network: nothing gets in




### TWENTY NETWORKS

#1 Database Replication	#8 Central or Cloud SOC	#15 Safety Systems	
#2 Device Emulation	#9 Network Intrusion Detection Systems	#16 Continuous High-Level Control	
#3 Application Replication	#10 Convenient File Transfer	#17 SCADA WAN	
#4 Remote Diagnostics & Maintenance	#11 IIoT And Cloud Communications	#18 Protective Relays	
#5 Emergency Maintenance	#12 Electronic Mail and Web Browsing	#19 Replicas DMZ	
#6 Continuous Remote Operation	#13 Partial Replication Protecting Trade Secrets	#20 Wireless Networks	
#7 Device Data Sniffing	#14 Scheduled Updates		



#### #14 SCHEDULED UPDATES

Industrial Network Enterprise Network




Anti-virus signatures are updated several times per day 7-10-day backlog of production orders from ERP is updated once or twice per day



#### #14 DISCIPLINED SCHEDULED UPDATES

Industrial Network

**Enterprise Network** 



Reversible gateway replicates ICS servers "out" and Anti-Virus (AV) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) servers "in" on a schedule – for disciplined, scheduled updates

#### #14 DISCIPLINED SCHEDULED UPDATES

**Enterprise Network Industrial Network** Replica AV Signature Updates Signature Updates **Plant Systems** Server **Enterpris Production Orders** Production Orders Resource **Planning** Gateway **Control-Critical Network** 


The reversible gateway does not forward arbitrary files, but actively fetches and validates only those files and other updates needed by the control-critical network



#### #9 NETWORK INTRUSION SENSORS

**Industrial Network** 

**Enterprise Network** 




IDS sensors should be deployed on IT networks - they need frequent updates and adjustments by central SOC analysts

But – mirror ports are notorious for bi-directionality, and all switch unidirectionality is software-based, not physical



#### #9 NETWORK INTRUSION SENSORS



**Control-Critical Network** 

Unidirectional gateway replicates mirror port traffic captures so that network IDS sensor can be deployed safely on IT network



#### WATERFALL - THE OT SECURITY COMPANY



## INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PODCAST

- Guests from all over the industrial security space
- Vendors issues, technology & approaches
- Government agencies programs & resources
- Owners & operators priorities & approaches
- Other recruiters, educators & more

If you like it, please submit a review & spread the word on social media

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


#### RAISING THE BAR

Attack capabilities only increase, so must our security posture

Identify & control information flows across physical and network perimeters

Control online flows unidirectionally Physical protection from online attacks



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