Author: Andrew Ginter

Industrial/OT cybersecurity programs include people, processes and technology. We often talk about our technology, unidirectional security gateways, here, but that technology alone is not all that is needed. A full program includes all the elements from the NIST framework. Click here to explore secu

There are voices in the industrial security community advocating a return to hard-wired protective relays, discarding two decades of progress in this space. But, a practical solution is to protect the protection. In power plants, as in high voltage substations, protective relays can be connected to

Critical infrastructure OT equipment directly connected to the Internet is the focus of the just-issued and very long NSA/CISA AA20-205A alert. Surprises: this is the first alert recommending a manual-ops fall-back plan (resilience) and a tamper-proof repository for "gold" images (to use during manu

Honda shut down a number of manufacturing facilities on Monday June 8, 2020, with most, but not all facilities back up again Tuesday. The (unconfirmed) cause appears to be an infestation by the “Snake” ransomware

The US government acts to protect the electric grid - but there is only so much any government can do. Unlike physical conflicts, the only way to defeat the most sophisticated cyber attacks is for individual sites to take the lead

In this time of COVID-19 travel restrictions and quarantines, understanding options for safe, secure remote access to Industrial Sites and Control Centers is especially important. This post reviews 3 common options for secure remote access and support: server replication, Remote Screen View and Secu

How would Iran launch a cyber retaliation? Would they fly operatives into the country, drive up to power plants and cut through barbed-wire perimeters with USB drives? No - they will use their zero-days and custom malware remotely, sipping coffee in the safety of their offices. Several jurisdictions

FireEye reports that the Triton (aka Trisys) malware targeting safety instrumented systems has been discovered at another undisclosed target in the Middle East. As a result of investigating that intrusion, FireEye reports that the threat actors behind Triton are a government-sponsored Russian agency